Turkey’s “Zero Problems with the Neighbors” Policy: Was It Realistic? by Askerov, Ali & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Turkey’s “Zero Problems with the Neighbors” Policy: Was It Realistic? 
 
By: Ali Askerov 
 
Askerov, A. (2017). Turkey’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy: Was it realistic? 
Contemporary Review of the Middle East, 4(2), 149-167 
 
Made available courtesy of Sage Publications: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2347798917694746 
 
***© Sage Publications. Reprinted with permission. No further reproduction is authorized 
without written permission from Sage Publications. This version of the document is not the 





With the advancement of power in 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has 
introduced revolutionary policies in Turkey in various realms, including foreign affairs. The new 
trend in the foreign policy focused on not having problems with neighbors. This could be 
possible or nearly possible theoretically but eliminating century-long and deep-rooted conflicts 
with some of the neighbors would not be easy in practice. The new idealistic/moralistic approach 
necessitated new ways of policy formulation based on mutual gains and unthinkable concessions 
on the part of Turkey. Ankara’s new approach had given a special importance to building bridges 
of trust with the neighbors, which also seemed attractive to the political leaders of the 
neighboring states. This idealistic/moralistic approach was vulnerable to the dynamic political 
and economic developments in the region and the world in general. The policy did not have a 
power of sustainability due to the various old, new, and emerging problems around Turkey and 
hence, the government had to give it up gradually and take a new course of foreign policy based 
on realistic approaches to defend its national interests 
 






When the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey in November of 2002, 
its leadership promised to introduce evolutionary policies in different realms, including the 
foreign policy area. The new foreign policy vision and strategy of the state was formed gradually 
emerging from the doctrine of strategic depth put forth by Ahmet Davutoglu. It had several 
components that included balance between security and freedom, multidimensional and 
multitrack diplomacy, an active diplomatic course, proactive diplomacy, and zero problems with 
neighbors (Sozen, 2010). The principle of zero problems with neighbors had been the core of 
Turkey’s foreign policy vision until recently. Although the principle sounded like a motto, it 
explained the new direction of the foreign policy toward all the states in the region, not just those 
bordering Turkey. Ankara’s primary aim was to sustain the goal of applying active efforts to 
solve the deep-rooted regional problems in line with a win-win approach through peaceful 
means. 
  Targeting zero problems with the neighbors sounded like an ambitious and courageous 
claim, but it was hardly realistic. Turkey has had several protracted conflicts with some of its 
neighbors such as Greece, over Cyprus and territorial waters in the Aegean Sea, and with 
Armenia, over so-called Armenian genocide, not to mention growing tensions with Iraq and 
Syria. Arguably, any statement, motto, or slogan, including zero problems with neighbors, may 
have a symbolic meaning but policy formulation is a realistic challenge requiring tangible 
courses defined through rational calculations. Having zero problems with the neighbors might 
also mean a long-term foreign policy target rather than a short-term objective. However, after 
having adopted such a policy, the general tendency to positive change would have been seen 
immediately. However, the developments in this direction were not stable and continuous. To 
discuss the dynamics of the Turkish foreign policy in the light of the zero problems with 
neighbors strategy, this article discusses Ankara’s policy vis-à-vis Armenia, Syria, Israel 
(although it is not an immediate neighbor of Turkey), and Russia since 2003 and evaluates the 
achievements and failures. 
 
Turkish Armenian Policy (2003-2015) 
 
 Armenians lived within the Ottoman Empire for centuries. Many scholars argue that they had 
found peaceful and fertile environment to form their ethnic identity only with the Ottoman 
Empire, which granted them special status with many privileges necessary for their cultural 
formation (Suslu, 2009). But the World War I brought about many tragic events in the Middle 
East, one of which was that Armenians and Turks have become blood enemies (Gunter, 2011; 
Suny, Gocek, & Naimark, 2011). This vendetta has been continuing for over a century. Many 
historians believe that the Ottoman Turks indeed committed genocide against Armenians while 
others believe that the Turks did not commit a genocidal crime against them, and all what they 
did was resettling the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire from one part of the country 
to another for security reasons (Akçam, 2012; Stone, 2007b; Suslu, 2009). While making the 
operation possible, the security forces did not touch those Armenians living in the urban places 
of the state, such as Istanbul, Izmir, and Aleppo (Lewy, 2005; Stone, 2007a). Others believe that 
Armenians and Turks were involved in the mutual massacres in the 1910s, and Armenians 
murdered at least as many Turks as the latter killed Armenians (Suslu, 2009). During a century 
since the tragic events, the issue has become protracted, and more importantly has been deeply 
politicized. Certainly, considerable historical research on this issue has been done, and it not 
always supports the pro-Armenian thesis (Alayarian, 2008; Gurun, 2001; Kévorkian, 2011; 
Lewy, 2005; McCarthy, 2006). However, not only many political entities around the world have 
recognized it as genocide, but some research circles have also taken it for granted literally 
multiplying the Armenian thesis by using secondhand documents (Lewy, 2005). 
  At such a historical moment, where the borders of myth and truth are blurred, the AKP 
government made an offer to the Armenian government to create an international commission 
composed of historians and scholars to investigate the issue objectively (Hill, Kirişci, & Moffatt, 
2015). One of the methods of research would be studying the archive materials that have not yet 
been investigated by researchers. The crucial part of the offer was that both parties would be 
bound by the findings and conclusions of the international committee. The Turkish government 
would be committed to cover all the associated costs. Although the Armenian counterparts did 
not approach this offer positively, both sides were willing to improve the relations through a 
number of joint political and economic projects (Kirisci & Moffat, 2014; Phillips, Columbia 
University, & Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2012). Yerevan was trying to 
minimize Russia’s influence over Armenia and was willing to improve relations with Turkey 
without preconditions. 
  Among some relatively minor developments, there were such important initiatives as 
opening the border entry points between the two countries to let border trade flourish. The main 
goal was the establishment of full diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey. One of the 
most important developments in this direction was the soccer diplomacy when President 
Abdullah Gul of Turkey visited Yerevan on 6 September 2008 to watch the qualifying game for 
the European championship between Armenian and Turkish national teams. Before long, Gul’s 
Armenian counterpart President Serzh Sargsyan visited Turkey to watch the game between the 
two teams in Turkey. While everything seemed to develop steadily, the factor of Azerbaijan was 
not calculated. 
  Unquestionably, both Turkey and Armenia are independent states enjoying all the rights 
bestowed by international law. Moreover, Turkey is a regional power with established Western 
values, such as democracy, rule of law, and free elections, and has been struggling to become a 
member of the European Union (EU). It is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and a strategic ally of the United States, which makes its status stronger and more 
prestigious. Turkey did not experience a crisis during the global economic disaster of 2008 and 
indeed its economy has grown significantly since then. Nonetheless, Ankara was hesitant to act 
independently in the Armenian case. Eventually, it had to suspend its policy regarding the 
opening of the borders and establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia, which has invaded 
and occupied Azerbaijani lands for over 20 years. 
  All the international attempts to resolve the Upper Karabakh crisis between Azerbaijan 
and Armenia have been unsuccessful. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has adopted 
four resolutions 822 (30 April 1993), 853 (29 July 1993), 874 (14 October 1993), and 884 (12 
November 1993) expressing its concern over the invasion of the Azerbaijani administrative 
regions, namely, Kelbajar, Agdam, Fuzuli, Jabrayil, Qubadli, and Zangilan, by the Armenian 
armed forces (Askerov & Matyok, 2015). These territories are outside of the disputed Upper 
Karabakh region and are still under Armenian control. The Azerbaijani population of these 
administrative regions had fled their homes for other parts of the country, thereby creating 
remarkable social and economic problems for the nation (Askerov, 2014). Russia had supported 
Armenia in its military achievements significantly, whereas Turkey provided diplomatic support 
for Azerbaijan in international arena (Askerov, 2015). Turkey joined Azerbaijan in imposing an 
economic blockade on landlocked Armenia in an effort to force it to end its invasion of the 
Azerbaijani lands. Ankara has always been subject to a significant pressure of its population to 
help Azerbaijan and its national interests in general. Civic pressure made Ankara avoid 
establishing any types of official political and economic ties with Yerevan. The new policy vis-à-
vis Armenia in the late 2000s, therefore, necessitated careful calculations that indicated to 
building essential preconditions through secret talks. Turkish and Armenian diplomats had 
clandestine talks in Switzerland in 2007 and 2008 to draw a roadmap toward improving relations 
between their countries. 
  The AKP leadership initially disregarded the Azerbaijani factor or underestimated it. The 
resolute position of the Turkish government became obvious with its blocking Azerbaijan’s flags 
into the stadium in Bursa, Turkey during the match between Turkish and Armenian national 
soccer teams. At first, it seemed as a simple regulation; however, the process took more serious 
character and developed into stern interpretations and criticism by analysts when Turkish TV 
channels broadcasted the event (Haberturk, 2009a). The government of Azerbaijan believing that 
opening the borders between Turkey and Armenia would empower the latter tremendously chose 
to apply a deterrence policy through raising the price for natural gas sold to Turkey, and 
removing the Turkish flag from the Martyrs’ Alley in Baku, among other things (Haberturk, 
2009b). However, it would hardly be realistic to hope that these would force Ankara to 
reconsider its new Armenian policy and especially when the Turkish people see Azerbaijan as a 
natural ally of Turkey due to shared cultural roots. 
  The popular reaction to the Turkish official policy through the political parties and 
organizations made the government to reconsider its strategy (Yilmaz, 2009). Eventually, Prime 
Minister Erdogan had to declare that key to the improvement of Armenian–Turkish relations 
would be the resolution of the Upper Karabakh conflict (Kohen, 2014). The economic reward of 
Azerbaijan is manifold, especially the Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) project, 
which seeks to transport Azerbaijani natural gas to Europe through Turkey (Hurriyet Daily 
News, 2015a). 
  Azerbaijan would not be able to affect Ankara’s policy, had there been no domestic 
support in Turkey for its position. Due to cultural and historical factors, Azerbaijan occupies a 
special place in the hearts of Turkish people and the policy of the Turkish government (Fidan, 
2010; Uslu & Ok, 2013). However, Azerbaijan’s strategic importance for Turkey should not be 
underestimated in causing Ankara to change its Armenian policy (Cecire, 2013) and this factor 
unexpectedly revealed Ankara’s foreign policy miscalculations. 
  It is likely that the policy change made Ankara lose some prestige and credit, since it did 
not keep its words given to the Armenian representatives who negotiated and signed protocols in 
Zurich on 10 October 2009. The protocols stipulated opening of the shared borders of Armenia 
and Turkey, and setting up formal diplomatic relations between the two countries. Mediated by 
the United States, Russia, and France, the agreement did not mention the Upper Karabakh 
conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The parliaments of the two countries needed to ratify 
the accord (BBC News, 2009; Phillips et al., 2012). However, the Upper Karabakh conflict 
appeared to be a major obstacle for the Armenian–Turkish rapprochement. The Zurich 
protocols remained unratified and the parties accused each other for it. 
 In a number of occasions, Armenian leadership mentioned that Ankara should keep its 
commitments independent from the Upper Karabakh issue in particular and Azerbaijan, in 
general. Yerevan paid a price at home and abroad, as Nalbandyan, minister of foreign affairs of 
Armenia, signed the protocols without consulting Armenian communities that led to the protests 
by diaspora communities against the president of Armenia. The failure of the protocols has made 
the Armenian leadership feel deceived by the Turkish officials (Cheterian, 2011). On the 
contrary, the Turkish leadership has kept Armenia responsible for the impasse in regards to the 
Zurich protocols accusing it in the failed results that stemmed from its Karabakh policy. 
Erdogan, the prime minister of Turkey of the time, during his visit to Baku, Azerbaijan in May of 
2009, stressed that opening borders between Armenia and Turkey, which was one of the major 
stipulations of the Zurich protocols, was subject to the resolution of the Upper Karabakh conflict 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Sabah, 2009). Obviously, Ankara miscalculated its abilities to 
persuade Baku about its new Armenian policy before signing the Zurich protocols. 
  Analysts argue that the resolutions of the Armenian–Turkish predicament lasting over a 
century and the newer Upper Karabakh conflict are interlinked because Armenians incline to 
identify the latter as a contemporary version of the former (Sandole, 2003). The opposite might 
also be true as the resolution of the Upper Karabakh conflict would remove the major 
impediment for Turkey to improve relations with Armenia. As discussed above, the Karabakh 
issue was the main obstacle for the ratification of the Zurich protocols, which could become a 
turning point in the history of Turkish–Armenian relations. Today, it is realistic to claim that 
Ankara’s policy was designed to test the reactions of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and if 
positive, Ankara would act differently in seeking further normalization with Armenia. 
  Notwithstanding the secret talks, Ankara did not anticipate that Yerevan would not agree 
to investigate historical events of the 1910s through the new international efforts. The most 
surprising point was about Ankara’s belief in its ability to establish good relations with Armenia 
while maintaining good ties with Azerbaijan, the adversary of Armenia. Otherwise, zero 
problems with both the neighbors at the same time would practically be impossible. 
 
Contending Syrian Policy 
 
Syria became part of the Ottoman Empire in the early sixteenth century and before that it was 
part of the Mamluk Empire. It remained as an integral part of the Ottoman Empire until shortly 
after the World War I when it became partially British and partially French mandate till 1946. In 
1938, the Hatay region of Syria seceded from it and became an independent republic and soon it 
joined to Turkey through a referendum. The role of the League of Nations in this process has 
been a justification tool for Turkey. Ever since, the Hatay issue has been one of the major 
sources of tension between these two states. For decades, Syria allowed militant Kurdish groups 
to establish bases on its territory to fight Turkey and used this as a deterrence policy (Ibrahim & 
Gürbey, 2000). 
  Even the leader of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan, remained in 
Damascus until 1998 when Ankara’s pressure forced his exile out of Syria. Later, when President 
Hafez al-Assad of Syria died, Turkey and Syria had an opportunity to start a new chapter in their 
history. Bashar al-Assad, the new president of Syria, visited Turkey in 2004 and a year later, 
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer of Turkey made a return visit to Syria despite international 
pressures. Later, President Assad and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan initiated new efforts 
to improve Turkish–Syrian relations, the warmth of which was reflected in their personal 
interactions. On 5 August 2008, Bashar and Asma Assads visited Turkey’s Bodroom for 
diplomacy and vacation, where Tayyip and Emine Erdogans welcomed them personally (Anter, 
2008; Milliyet, 2008). However, the favorable state of their relations did not last long and started 
to worsen in the wake of the popular protests in Syria that broke out in March 2011. 
  A refugee flow from Syria to Turkey began almost with the start of the Syrian Civil War 
in 2011 and this raised serious concerns for the latter. In mid-2011, Prime Minister Erdogan 
harshly criticized the Syrian government for human rights violations (BBC News, 2011a; Dunya 
Times, 2011). After meeting with President Assad in Syria on 9 August 2011, Turkey’s foreign 
minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, announced that Turkey completely suspended all of the agreements 
between Turkey and Syria. In general, Erdogan’s anti-Assad rhetoric knew no limits. Moreover, 
the minor events in Syria against Turkey admonished the deterioration of the relations between 
these two countries. For example, two Turkish pilgrim buses were attacked by the Syrian soldiers 
at a checkpoint near Homs on 21 November 2011 when they returned from Saudi Arabia leaving 
two people injured (BBC News, 2011b). This antagonistic approach continued in the following 
year as well. On 9 April 2012, Syrian forces fired across the Syria–Turkey border killing two and 
injuring several people (Muir, 2012). 
  Apparently, the dramatic change of the Turkish policy vis-à-vis Syria was partially a 
result of Syria’s antagonistic policy toward Turkey. The turning point in the Syria–Turkey 
relations was the shoot down of the Turkish fighter jet by Syrian forces on 22 June 2012. 
Although Ankara has repeatedly expressed its concern for civilian casualties in Syria, the 
persisting ambiguities of Turkey’s Syrian policy have played a significant role in the 
deterioration of the relations. Ankara eventually yielded to the US policy in Syria that was 
supporting the opposition forces, Free Syrian Army, against the Assad regime. 
 Ankara made miscalculated and hasty decisions to cut off ties with Syria in 2012. 
Erdogan had frequently used very weighty language in the address of the Syrian leadership to 
justify Ankara’s rigid policy against the Syrian government in the eyes of his citizens (Hurriyet 
Daily News, 2012b). On a number of different occasions, he publicly expressed his certainty 
about being able to pray in the Umayyad Mosque of Damascus within a year, thereby implying 
his belief of rapid removal of the Assad regime (Hurriyet, 2012a). Ankara’s unlimited wishful 
statements about Syria have shadowed its realistic approach to this crisis. It is widely believed 
that Turkey has played an indirect role in the Syrian conflict, as considerable amount of weapons 
Syrian rebels possess has entered Syria through Turkey (BBC News, 2013). The Turkish 
government has not rejected supporting the Free Syrian Army (FSA) but always denied any 
types of cooperation with the ISIS (The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). Being a target of 
numerous bloody terrorist attacks of the ISIS and recent operations of Turkish army against this 
terrorist organization in Syria and Iraq have proven Ankara’s honesty. 
 Perhaps, Turkey’s economy has been affected more adversely than that of any other 
country in the region due to the internal war in Syria. According to the United Nations High 
Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR/Syria Regional Refugee Response, 2016), as of December 
2016, Turkey hosted over two and half million refugees from Syria (ibid.). In such 
circumstances, having no political leverage over the Syrian issue is a serious loss for Ankara. 
Criticizing Erdogan’s hurried Damascus policy of isolation, opposition leader Kemal 
Kilicdaroglu once stated that unlike his EU counterparts, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet 
Davutoglu, the architect of the zero problems with neighbors policy, could not call his Syrian 
colleague by phone and warn of the consequences of unrealistic Syrian policy pursued by the 
AKP government (Gercek Gundem, 2015). 
  By withdrawing its ambassador from Damascus in 2012, Turkey disabled itself of 
reaching out to the Syrian leadership directly, which was necessary for managing the conflict 
peacefully or at least more constructively. For a country that claims zero problems with its 
neighbors, more leverages for peaceful engagement are crucial. Thus, although somehow 
justified, Ankara’s hasty decision has not been supportive for its policy toward the neighbors set 
earlier. As a regional power, Turkey has weakened its own influence in Syria and the region as a 
whole by pushing itself out of the Syrian game. 
  Prime Minister Erdogan’s obsessive usage of religious rhetoric (Hurriyet, 2012a) while 
condemning Syrian political leadership has considerably undermined Turkey’s credibility as a 
fair and credible actor in the region. Over time, it has become clear that Iran, along with Russia 
and China, exercises more power and influence in Syria than Turkey, since the policies of the 
latter has deprived Ankara of the opportunities of having a political weight in its neighboring 
country. Erdogan has often defended Ankara’s policy by employing justice and human 
rights narratives (ibid.). Assad’s reaction to this has been ironic and he accused Erdogan in 
provoking sectarian tensions in the region (Los Angeles Times, 2012). However, the suggestion 
Erdogan made on 24 September 2015 about Assad that he could have a role to play in the future 
political transition of Syria (Tol, 2015) was both a confirmation of failing Turkish Syrian policy 
and a signal of Ankara’s readiness to reframe it. 
  The visible reality is that Turkey has been gaining more influence in Syria with 
abandoning its old zero problems with neighbors policy, which straightforwardly helped neither 
peace nor war in the region. This is seen from the developments after the fall of Aleppo to the 
Assad regime and its supporters in December 2016. The meeting of the ministers of foreign 
affairs of Turkey, Iran, and Russia in Moscow on 20 December 2016 to work toward a political 
solution to end the crisis in Syria has manifested Ankara’s renewed role as a regional power. On 
the contrary, the new developments in Syria have revealed the failure of Obama’s Syrian 
inaction policy, since the United States was neither invited to the meeting, nor was consulted 
(Krauthammer, 2016). 
 
Relations with Israel: Deterioration and Normalization 
 
 Turkey has no direct borders with Israel; however, the elements of their historical affiliation and 
regional role they play, as well as advanced communication means have removed the appearance 
of physical impediments due to distance in their good relations. Moreover, the littoral states of 
the Mediterranean Sea and two regional powers, Turkey and Israel had been good partners 
cooperating in many fields including military and secret intelligence (Jewish Virtual Library, 
2016; Lake, 2010). The historical help of the Ottoman Turks offered to Jews ousted from 
different parts of Europe and Russia at different times, especially in the 1800s, is well depicted in 
the Jewish history (Avraham, 2013). In some sense, this has been a reason for the Jewish lobbies 
in the United States to support the Turkish position in regard to the Armenian issue (Lake, 2010). 
Ankara’s initial success in improving relations with Damascus and strengthening ties with 
Jerusalem resulted in its mediation role in several rounds of indirect talks between Israel and 
Syria (Inbar, 2005, 2011; Stern & Ross, 2013). 
  This good relationship gradually diminished and ended at Davos in 2009 with Erdogan’s 
severe criticism of the Israel’s Palestinian policy in the World Economic Forum (Bennhold, 
2009). Prime Minister Erdogan has contributed one minute to the political terminology when he 
persistently asked moderator David Ignatius of The Washington Post for a minute to react to 
Israeli President Shimon Peres who was talking about the Israel’s military campaigns in Gaza. 
This event was not accepted as courteous in Israel, and it has become the turning point for 
deteriorating Turkish–Israeli relations. 
  In January 2010, Israel issued a severe rebuke to Turkey’s ambassador Ahmet Oguz 
Celikkol over a Turkish television series, Valley of the Wolves, which portrayed Israeli 
intelligence agents as baby kidnappers running operations to abduct children and convert them to 
Judaism (NBC NEWS, 2010). Celikkol was summoned to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel 
to meet with Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon who did not shake hands with the 
ambassador and ordered not to have a Turkish flag on display. Ayalon told the cameramen in 
Hebrew that the Turkish ambassador was deliberately seated on a sofa lower than his own chair. 
The event initiated a new jargon, lower chair, in diplomacy. The follow up events did not 
improve their relations and rather Turkey canceled a military exercise involving Israel and the 
latter ruled out Turkey’s resuming its role as mediator in indirect Israel–Syria talks (Eligur, 
2012). 
 The Mavi Marmara incident was the culmination of the crisis between Turkey and Israel 
when on 31 May 2010 Turkish ship, MV Mavi Marmara, carrying people and humanitarian aid 
for Gaza Strip was raided by the Israeli commandos killing 12 people. Israel severely objected to 
this campaign long before the attack happened but this was not an adequate move to stop it. The 
campaigners did not see anything against law and morality in what they were doing but the 
consequences appeared to be tragic for them. Israeli navy attack on the vessel in the international 
waters complicated the issue further. Turkey reacted to the incident severely demanding an 
apology from Israel and taking the case to international arbitration (BBC News, 2016a). 
 In 2010, the future of Turkish–Israeli relations was quite unpredictable both because of 
the hard stance of the respective governments and the new conflict issues they had created. 
Civilian victims of the Mavi Marmara crisis tied the communities to the problem and removing 
the new issues would entail a prolonged time for satisfying the aspirations of the citizens. The 
price of making the problem community-based instead of interest-based might always be costly 
because conflicts in which different identity groups are involved are usually more protracted 
(Kriesberg, 2007). Therefore, making civilians involved in it was a strategic mistake on both 
sides. In a sense, the Israeli–Palestine conflict had been enlarged through engulfing Turkey, 
which could have played a more active role in its transformation as an independent third party 
and impartial actor. However, it seemed Ankara was not interested in preserving the balanced 
policy between Israel and Palestine, thus ignoring its own national interests. Hitherto, it is 
obvious that having no problems with two hostile countries at the same time by supporting one 
of them is logically impossible. 
 Israel eventually apologized in March 2013 for the raid and agreed to pay compensation 
to the families of people that lost their lives as a result of the attack on the ship. However, this 
victory of Ankara did not make up the economic cost it paid due to worsened relations between 
Turkey and Israel. Like Israel, Turkey lost its best and most reliable strategic ally in the region 
for a prolonged time, which caused pausing strategic and economic cooperation. As a result, both 
countries suffered economic loss from the delayed trade especially in the energy sector (Volfova, 
2014). But, Turkey lost prestige as well, both inside and outside, as it was not able to deter Israel 
correspondingly. On an occasion, Erdogan postponed his trip to Gaza that had originally been 
planned for April 2013 to unforeseen future as a result of the demand of the United States. 
Furthermore, the developments showed that Ankara’s zero problems with neighbors policy does 
not and cannot exist independently from the dynamics of conflicting events taking place in the 
region. The interests of both Turkey and Israel eventually made them normalize relations in mid-
2016 after a six-year rupture. 
 Today, while one minute has popularity in the Turkish domestic context with a different 
connotation, both Turkey and Israel make special efforts to restore the old strategic partnership 
once they enjoyed. Among other factors, Israel’s need in Turkish alliance to end its isolation in 
the region has helped with the normalization process by starting a new rapprochement policy. 
However, the main factor for transforming the conflict and improving the relations is associated 
with Ankara’s cession of its old foreign policy approach, zero problems with neighbors, which 
left Turkey with almost no friends in the region. 
 
Crisis in Russia 
 
 The last case to consider here is the crisis between Turkey and Russia that started with their 
contending policies over Syria and culminated with the downing of the Russian fighter jet by the 
Turkish forces on the Turkish–Syrian border on 24 November 2015. Before the crisis, Ankara 
and Moscow had developed strong relations cooperating in economic and strategic areas. 
However, Ankara had already started to shift its general foreign policy direction to a new path by 
the onset of this crisis. The case of Russo-Turkish crisis illustrates the importance of considering 
the complexity of dynamic issues while formulating new foreign policy goals, rather than 
pursuing previously formulated fixed foreign policies. 
  Ankara and Moscow had disagreements in their policies over the Syrian crisis, which 
gradually developed into a problem as the civil war progressed (Ozel, 2016). However, the 
turning point was the shot down of the Russian military jet in late 2015. Some similarities 
between this event and the Mavi Marmara crisis with Israel manifested in the weeks subsequent 
to the downing of the aircraft. Moscow blamed Ankara in a deliberate shooting of the fighter jet, 
whereas Turkey blamed Russia for being reckless and culpable accusing the Russian pilot of 
violating the Turkish borders (ibid.). The crisis escalated rapidly bringing about harsh measures 
on the part of Russia, which chose economic sanctions against Turkey. This caused Turkey’s 
economy big losses in the areas of tourism, construction firms, and food exports (Girit, 2016). 
  Although the consequences of the crisis adversely affected economies of both the 
countries, the political leaderships made repeated declarations about their intentions not to 
change their positions (BBC News, 2015a, 2015b; Sabah, 2015; Yeni Safak, 2015). Russia has 
made it explicit that an official apology from Ankara and compensation for both the material 
damage and the life of the pilot would be necessary to reconsider its policy toward Turkey. 
Ankara, however, on different occasions stated that it would act in the same manner, if necessary 
(Sabah, 2015). The subsequent developments have shown that these two countries wanted a 
minor push to remove all the barriers in front of them to start a new phase of cooperation. Even a 
cursory examination of why Ankara softened its position so quickly and Russia accepted the 
half-hearted apology tendered in the late 2016 (Mercouris, 2016) indicates that both countries 
were ready to cooperate for mutual gains. 
 With the apology of President Erdogan on 24 June 2016, the latest RussoTurkish crisis 
has entered a new phase of de-escalation offering new opportunities for rapprochement. Both 
Turkey and Russia have mutual interests in cooperation, despite their conflicting interests in 
Syria. Turkey supports the Syrian opposition against Assad’s government, whereas Russia backs 
the Assad regime. Obviously, the complexities of the crisis between Ankara and Moscow 
originate from multifaceted regional issues, rather than bilateral relations. Similarly, managing 
the crisis necessitates a policy based on multilevel and multimodal approach based on 
realistic moves. 
  The crisis between Ankara and Moscow was relatively shorter as they managed to break 
the ices and improve their relations rapidly. Arguably, with no active third party role in the 
process, the relations between these two countries would hardly be improved so quickly. The 
institution of mediation started to work immediately after the crisis started and eventually 
yielded a positive outcome (Yetkin, 2016). Other than mediation, a few other abortive attempts, 
such as talks between the ministers of foreign affairs took place. The third party role was 
employed primarily by the governmental actors external to the conflict to find a solution to the 
problem without bringing the parties to the negotiation table. Certainly, these international 
mediators—President Aliyev of Azerbaijan, President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, and 
Abdulatipov, the head of the Republic of Dagestan, among others—had their own interests in the 
compromise of the sides to conflict. All these leaders function within the sphere of Russian 
influence and can hardly go against Putin’s will. Besides, they want to maintain good relations 
with Turkey, a leading Islamic state, with which they have cultural ties. In this case, the question 
of why Turkey relaxed its initially tough position against Russia could hardly be answered by its 
zero problems with neighbors approach. 
  The main reasons for Ankara’s policy change vis-à-vis Russia include economic loss, 
losing trust in its Western allies, trying to (re)gain a new strategic ally to deal with the regional 
issues, and increasing domestic unhappiness, among others. The crisis hit Turkey’s tourism, 
construction, energy, and agriculture sectors gravely causing billions of dollars’ loss. A study 
suggests that if not removed, the economic sanctions on Turkey would cost the economy of the 
country a loss of US$2.3 billion to US$8.3 billion by the end of 2016, excluding the suitcase 
trade worth US$2.5 billion and other indirect effects (Sonmez, 2016). The government had tried 
hard to produce alternative ways, such as intensifying cooperation with Arab countries to fill the 
gap hollowed by Russia but this was possible only partially. 
 Another factor making Ankara reconsider its position was the strategic approach of its 
Western allies to the regional problems that are of a vital importance for Turkey. Arguably, 
Ankara had developed an understanding over time that the West was not willing to remove 
Assad from the power, despite its initial attempts. The increasing threat of the ISIS has been a 
major factor defining the priorities of the West in the region, which shifted the concerns about 
the Assad regime to a secondary place. The impact of this on Ankara’s policy was strong, since it 
had already burnt all the bridges with Damascus despite the improved relations with it prior to 
the conflict. A policy change on the part of its Western allies put Ankara on an unfavorable 
position. Turkey found itself in a position that was good neither for proceeding, nor for 
withdrawing. It expected the Western countries to continue serious military operations against 
the regime in Syria through the alliance with the FSA. The priorities of the West, however, had 
changed with the changing circumstances in the region. The West, especially the United States, 
saw the Assad regime as less dangerous than the ISIS and looked for new strategies, the 
indispensable part of which became cooperating with the Kurds of Syria (Hume, 2016). 
  The crisis of Syria has instigated new problems for Turkey’s security, more importantly, 
for its survival within its existing boundaries because of the emergence of new and more critical 
conditions in the region that offer actual and potential support for Rojava, a Kurdish region in 
northern Syria. The United States and Turkey had developed a problem over the People’s 
Protection Units (YPG), the military wing of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), 
which Ankara sees as an extension of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), recognized as a 
terrorist organization by many countries, including the United States (Cagaptay & Tabler, 2015; 
Hume, 2016; US Department of State, n.d.). Ankara sees the YPG as the main threat to Turkey’s 
national unity and territorial integrity. The United States, however, declared that it does not share 
Turkish views about YPG (Hurriyet Daily News, 2015b), whereby displeasing Ankara. The 
discrepancy between the policies of Ankara and Washington has deepened over time seriously 
damaging the trust between them. Its impact on Ankara has been serious, which manifested itself 
in various declarations of the President Erdogan of Turkey (Haberturk, 2016). Ankara’s search 
for alternative policies has contributed to the normalization process with Moscow. 
 The latest developments in the region highlighted Ankara’s needs for a new strategic ally, 
at the very least, an alternative ally that must be trusted in crises. Revitalizing the relations with 
Russia seemed to meet Turkey’s needs more, since it has established itself as the major actor in 
the Middle East beating the inactive Western countries. However, before the Turkish–Russian 
crisis was over, it seemed nearly impossible to end it for several reasons, two of which are 
noteworthy. First, Turkey and Russia had their relations stuck in an impasse breaking which 
required a high level of readiness by the parties, which did not initially exist. Second, to be 
Russia’s strategic ally meant for Turkey to change its Syrian policy, at least partially. Both of 
these factors created new challenges for Ankara but it managed to produce a new policy to break 
the impasse. Prime Minister Davutoglu, the architect of the zero problems with neighbors policy, 
was relieved from his position by President Erdogan on 3 May 2016. Before long, the new Prime 
Minister, Binali Yildirim, announced a rapprochement policy toward those with who Turkey was 
in conflict. The realistic steps taken by the new Turkish government facilitated the addressing of 
deep-rooted foreign policy issues of the country. 
  Visibly, the crisis hurt not only Turkey but also Russia, since it deprived both countries 
of mutual gains through cooperation. From the moment Russia applied sanctions against Turkey, 
both countries started to suffer economically. Russia’s sanctions halted mutual projects in the 
energy and construction sectors, and increased prices in its own food market (Cetingulec, 2015, 
2016; Girit, 2016). More importantly, Russia had to halt the developing strategic partnership 
with Turkey. This was not in the interests of Moscow, since Putin had tried to build special 
strategic relationship with Ankara to form a new regional alliance, although Turkey is a NATO 
country. Over the past two decades, Turkey and Russia have cooperated in several joint energy 
projects. Thus, Putin readily used the opportunity offered to him by means of mediation to secure 
Russia’s national interests through improving relations with Turkey. 
  Moreover, Putin, as a master of using situations in his own favor, saw the crisis as an 
opportunity to create even stronger ties with Turkey. He patiently waited for the moment; after 
he received what he wanted in the form of formal apology by President Erdogan and secured the 
prestige of his own and his country, Putin saw no barriers to starting a new chapter with Turkey. 
The Kremlin made every attempt to show that it was not against Ankara in general. Russia was 
the first country to express solidarity with the Turkish government immediately after the coup 
attempt on 15 July 2016, when the Obama administration waited several hours to make a 
statement. This was one of the many tactics adopted by Putin to signal that he was a friend of 
Turkey and did not desire any chaos and instability in this country. This was a thoughtful policy 
targeting future rapprochement with Turkey. 
  Arguably, Moscow has seen Turkey as a new partner in shaping peace and security in 
Syria. The recent developments around the Syrian crisis shows that Ankara and Moscow have 
managed to build a new and strong strategic partnership in the security field. Russian–Turkish 
prolonged partnership in security field may seem eccentric and fragile due to Turkey’s NATO 
membership. However, their national interests may necessitate long-term strategic partnership. 
Russia’s conflict with the West since the annexation of Crimea on 18 March 2014 has increased 
its needs for better ties with the leading regional states such as Turkey. Therefore, using 
Ankara’s displeasure with the US policy toward the Kurds of Syria, the Kremlin did not want to 
waste the opportunity to turn Turkey away from the West (Idiz, 2016). Having started with 
Erdogan’s letter of apology, the Turkish–Russian rapprochement has continued after the fall of 
Aleppo on 22 December 2016. It is likely that Russian–Turkish relations have a strategic 
character with long-term goals. 
  Apparently, Ankara has abandoned its zero problems with neighbors policy vis-à-vis 
Moscow and framed its new foreign policy more realistically around its own national interest. 
The renewed desire about cooperation between Russia and Turkey seems to be very strong. 
Despite the disaster in Aleppo, for which Russia is blamed along with the Assad regime and Iran, 
and the assassination of Russian ambassador, Andrey Karlov in Ankara on 19 December 2016, 
the leaderships of both countries have made strong statements of further cooperation (Evrensel, 
2016). 
 
Turkey’s New Concerns 
 
Turkey has faced dynamic international, regional, and domestic developments since AKP came 
to power in 2002. New developments in the realms of internal and external security, as well as 
economic and political life of the country have made the Turkish government to abandon its zero 
problems with neighbors policy and adopt new and realistic strategies in formulating its foreign 
policy goals and implementing them. Unlike the zero problems with neighbors policy focused 
primarily on the neighboring countries, the new approach is based on particular political and 
economic issues that offer some importance for the country. 
  The security concerns of Turkey due to the emergence of the ISIS and civil war 
in Syria have forced Ankara to develop new policies to address ongoing and emerging issues. 
Ankara’s expectations for building a new regional order has not materialized and recent 
developments in Syria, including the fall of Aleppo, have shown that Assad regime has 
consolidated its power in Syria. In addition to the concerns about continuing threats from the 
terrorists based on Syrian soil, Turkey developed new anxieties about US-backed YPG’s 
increasing role in the regional affairs. Ankara has repeatedly objected to the US cooperation with 
YPG, declaring it as a branch of the PKK, but the US officials declared that their views on the 
issue did not overlap with those of Ankara (Daily Sabah, 2016a). This has contributed to the 
change in Ankara’s foreign policy significantly since it damaged the trust Turkey had in the 
United States as an ally. 
  The internal security issues of Turkey have also been a major problem for the 
government, which faced the fierce 15 July 2016 coup attempt. The government survived the 
coup, which exposed huge domestic security problems. The government’s claims that the coup is 
connected to the foreign sources have made it reconsider its approach to some foreign countries, 
including the United States that delays extradition of Fethullah Gulen, who is accused of 
masterminding the coup attempt (Hurriyet Daily News, 2017). 
 The increased terrorist attacks of both the ISIS and PKK on the Turkish soil (BBC News, 
2016b; Daily Sabah, 2015) have revealed the flaw of the Turkish government in providing 
security to its citizens and tourists in Turkey. Some of the last events include the assassination of 
the Russian ambassador Gennadiy Karlov, attack to the military servicemen in Kayseri and 
Istanbul, all of which took place within 10 days in December 2016. As never before, Turkey 
finds itself under the crossfire that necessitates developing new policies to address both internal 
and external issues. It is well accepted now that an idealistic/moralistic zero problems with 




 The AKP started several political, economic, and cultural reforms with its advancement of 
power in Turkey in 2002. The new trend of foreign policy was articulated idealistically through 
the adoption of the motto of zero problems with neighbors. The early developments showed that 
it was more than a rhetoric and the government started multidirectional rapprochements, even 
revolutionary policies in some cases, toward the neighboring countries. However, the new 
policies formulated in line with idealistic/moralistic thought significantly reduced rational and 
realistic calculations to frame sustainable foreign policy strategies of the country. Employing 
idealist attitudes in making a foreign policy is also natural, but as this case study suggests, 
relying solely on idealism/moralism for a foreign policy is practically impossible and would 
bring about challenges for national interests. 
  In this case, one of the problems has been the discrepancy between the government’s 
declarations and its actual policies. They frequently did not converge because of the dynamics of 
regional events, needs, interests, as well as the attitudes and behaviors of other actors. The 
discrepancy between idealistic declarations and realistic actions was also a result of inaccurate 
policy calculations made by the Turkish government. In some cases, through adhering to 
idealistic moves, Turkey disqualified itself as a rational regional actor, thereby damaging its 
national interests, and more importantly, disabling itself to contribute to the regional peace. 
  Turkey’s zero problems with its neighbors as an idealistic target certainly deserves 
applauds, since it rests upon the notions of constructive dialogue, peaceful coexistence, and 
cooperation for mutual gains, among others. However, pragmatically speaking, the 
materialization of this policy has never been realistic in the context of the region at this 
historically threatening moment. Unless Turkey acquires the status of a neutral country, which 
does not seem possible until all of its internal identity-based problems are resolved, having zero 
problems with the neighbors seems very unrealistic. Realistically, it is impossible to please 
Armenia while supporting Azerbaijan, to delight Israel while sustaining Palestinian position, and 
to gratify Damascus while helping the Syrian rebels. The complexities of the issues and 
dynamism of the events in the region require rapid moves to formulate new foreign policy 
strategies or make necessary maneuvers and changes to play an effective role in peaceful/useful 
activities, and no state desiring to fulfill idealistic or realistic sentiments it has should deprive 
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